Proceed with Caution.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52, no. 1 (2022): 6-25.

Co-authored with Chad Lee-Stronach.

It is becoming more common that the decision-makers in private and public institutions are predictive algorithmic systems, not humans. This article argues that relying on algorithmic systems is procedurally unjust in contexts involving background conditions of structural injustice. Under such nonideal conditions, algorithmic systems, if left to their own devices, cannot meet a necessary condition of procedural justice, because they fail to provide a sufficiently nuanced model of which cases count as relevantly similar. Resolving this problem requires deliberative capacities uniquely available to human agents. After exploring the limitations of existing formal algorithmic fairness strategies, the article argues that procedural justice requires that human agents relying wholly or in part on algorithmic systems proceed with caution: by avoiding doxastic negligence about algorithmic outputs, by exercising deliberative capacities when making similarity judgments, and by suspending belief and gathering additional information in light of higher-order uncertainty.

Introduction: The Political Philosophy of Data and AI.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52, no. 1 (2022): 1-5.

Co-authored with Kate Vredenburgh and Seth Lazar.

There is a thriving literature in other disciplines on the legal and political implications of big data and AI, as well as a rapidly growing literature within philosophy concerning ethical problems surrounding AI. There is relatively little work to date, however, from the perspective of political philosophy. This special issue was borne out of a recognition that political philosophy has a crucial role to play in conversations about how AI ought to reshape our joint political, social, and economic life. The widespread deployment of AI calls attention to fundamental, long-standing problems in political philosophy with renewed urgency, and creates genuinely new philosophical problems of political significance.

Introduction: The Historical Rawls

Modern Intellectual History 18, no. 4 (2021): 899-905.

Introduction to the Forum on “The Historical Rawls,” co-authored with Sophie Smith and Teresa M. Bejan.

Economic Participation Rights and the All-Affected Principle

Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 10, no. 2 (2017): 1-21.

The democratic boundary problem raises the question of who has democratic participation rights in a given polity and why. One possible solution to this problem is the all-affected principle (AAP), according to which a polity ought to enfranchise all persons whose interests are affected by the polity’s decisions in a morally significant way. While AAP offers a plausible principle of democratic enfranchisement, its supporters have so far not paid sufficient attention to economic participation rights. I argue that if one commits oneself to AAP, one must also commit oneself to the view that political participation rights are not necessarily the only, and not necessarily the best, way to protect morally weighty interests. I also argue that economic participation rights raise important worries about democratic accountability, which is why their exercise must be constrained by a number of moral duties.

The Political Philosophy of Data and AI.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2022).

A special issue co-edited with Kate Vredenburgh and Seth Lazar.

The Historical Rawls.

Modern Intellectual History (2021).

A special issue co-edited with Teresa Bejan and Sophie Smith.